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Abstract
We explore the relationship between the social interaction of parents and their
offspring from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Our theoretical frame-
work establishes possible explanations for the intergenerational transfer of social
interaction whereby the social interaction of the parent may influence that of their
offspring and vice versa. The empirical evidence, based on four data sets covering
Great Britain and the U.S., is supportive of our theoretical priors. We find robust
evidence of intergenerational links between the social interaction of parents and
their offspring supporting the existence of positive bi-directional intergenerational
effects in social interaction.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades there has been increasing interest in the economics literature
in the implications of social interaction and social capital for socio-economic outcomes
such as educational attainment and employment. Given that social skills, and personal-
ity characteristics in general, are an important part of human capital, see Bowles et al.
(2001), it is not surprising that the relationship between social interaction and socio-
economic outcomes such as education has attracted growing interest in the economics
literature. In general, empirical evidence supports a positive relationship between social
interaction and educational attainment, see, for example, Brown and Taylor (2007), Ian-
naccone (1998), and Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001). Furthermore, Glaeser et al. (2002),
who report evidence supporting a positive correlation between education and social in-
teraction proxied by membership in organizations, state that this relationship is not only
well known in the social capital literature, but is also “one of the most robust empirical
regularities in the social capital literature.” (Glaeser et al., 2002, p. F455).
It is apparent that intergenerational aspects to the accumulation of social capital may
exist as in the case of human capital accumulation. A vast literature exists exploring
the determinants and implications of human capital, with recent interest in intergenera-
tional aspects such as the link between the human capital of parents and their children.
A number of explanations have been put forward to explain the existence of a positive
intergenerational relationship in educational attainment. Firstly, it could be due to ge-
netic transmission of ability, i.e. more able parents have more able children. Secondly,
it could reflect a direct transfer of knowledge from parent to child, whereby parents
with higher levels of education are more able to help their children with their learning.
Alternatively, it may be due to economic factors such as income and wealth, with such
resources providing access to, for example, books and private tutoring. In practice,
however, it is likely that a combination of these factors is responsible for the observed
positive relationship between parents’ and children’s human capital (see, for example,
Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Blanden et al., 2007).
In contrast to the human capital literature, the relationship between parents’ and
children’s social interaction is relatively unexplored in the economics literature. One
might conjecture that if a child is brought up by parents who are socially active, then
this may become the norm for the child. Indeed, in the context of the more general
concept of social capital, Putnam (2000) remarks that “the parents’ social capital ...
confers benefits on their offspring, just as children benefit from their parents’ financial
and human capital,” (Putnam, 2000, p. 299). Similarly, Brown and Taylor (2009) argue
that an intergenerational link between social interaction may exist whereby parental so-
cial interaction may be positively associated with their children’s involvement in formal
social activity, which in turn may be conducive to human capital accumulation.
In general, the existing research in this area is drawn from the sociological literature
and has focused on social capital rather than social interaction. For example, Duncan
et al. (2005) analyse the relationship between 17 characteristics of mothers and their
children using U.S. data, where the characteristics of parents and offspring are both mea-
sured during adolescence. One of seven domains explored relates to social activities such
as church attendance. They highlight four mechanisms which may explain correlations
between such characteristics of mothers and their offspring, namely: socio-economic re-
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sources; parenting practices; genetic inheritance, and role modelling, whereby the latter
two explanations find relatively more support. In a similar vein, Vesel (2006) explores
whether social capital is transmitted from parents to children using survey data relating
to the Czech Republic. The empirical analysis, which is based on establishing correla-
tions rather than causal relationships, suggests weak intergenerational transmission of
social capital. Similar findings are reported by Jennings and Stoker (2004) relating to
the intergenerational transmission of social trust. In contrast, Beck and Jennings (1982)
report a strong correlation between parents’ and children’s civic participation in the U.S.
In the economics literature, Guiso et al. (2008) model the intergenerational trans-
mission of priors about the trustworthiness of others within an overlapping generations
framework. Following Dohmen et al. (2007), using the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), they report empirical evidence supporting a positive correlation between the
trust of parents and their children by modeling the effect of parents’ trust on their chil-
dren’s trust. Due to the limited availability of information on the key variables such as
trust, which were elicited from parents and all their offspring who were aged 18 or over
at the time of the interview, these two studies analyse information mainly drawn from
the 2003 and 2004 waves of the GSOEP, and hence they are unfortunately unable to
exploit the panel nature of the data.
More recently, within the economics literature, using data drawn from the U.S. Na-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, Okumura and Usui (2010) explore the effect
of parents’ social skills on their children’s sociability. Respondents aged between 20
and 28 were asked about their sociability as a child such as the number of clubs they
participated in during high school, whereas, due to the absence of information on their
parent’s social skills, parent’s social skills are proxied by the people skills needed in
the occupations the respondent’s parents were in when the respondent was aged 14.1
Support is found for a positive association between children’s sociability and the proxy
for parents’ social skills.
In this paper, we focus on social interaction rather than the arguably more general
concepts of social capital and trust. Moreover, although a small number of existing
studies in this area have presented interesting empirical evidence supporting the exis-
tence of positive correlations between the social capital of parents and their offspring,
it is apparent however that inferences relating to causality cannot be drawn from such
studies. In addition, existing studies have not allowed for the possibility that a parent’s
social capital may influence that of their child and that the child’s social capital may
influence that of their parent. In the context of social interaction, such a possibility is
arguably particularly apparent. For example, if a child engages in a range of activities,
such as sport or dancing lessons, it is conceivable that parents will become involved in
social events associated with such activities or, alternatively, may simply meet other
parents which may lead to social interaction or information about social interaction op-
portunities. Hence, an important contribution of our paper lies in the fact that we allow
for causality to operate in both directions. In addition, we exploit the panel nature of
1The definitions of the people skills required in occupations are based on occupational characteristics
detailed in the US Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT ), which are related to
objective and subjective evaluations, and include eight variables ranging from ’talking and/or hearing’
to ‘preferences for activities involving business contacts with people versus a preference for activities of
a scientific and technical nature’ (Okumura and Usui, 2010, p.6).
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our data in order to shed some light on the causal nature of such relationships. To be
specific, our theoretical framework presented in Section 2 establishes possible theoretical
explanations for the two-way intergenerational transfer of social interaction. We then
explore this intergenerational relationship from an empirical perspective. In order to
explore the robustness of our results, our empirical analysis draws on four data sets
namely, the British National Child Development Study, the British Cohort Study, the
U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth. Our empirical analysis supports the existence of positive relationships between
parents’ and children’s social interaction.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section we set out a theoretical framework establishing possible explanations
for the intergenerational transfer of social interaction, which in contrast to the existing
literature, is a two-way process (incorporating movements from the younger to older
generation as well as the reverse). The section has two parts. The first part briefly
introduces Becker’s (1974) theory of social interaction. The second part extends the
theory to explain how two-way intergenerational social capital transfers might arise.
2.1 A Model of Social Interaction
The foundation for our theoretical framework is the model of social interaction developed
by Becker (1974). This model incorporates social interaction (as discussed in the broader
context of wants and their determinants in, for example, Bentham, 1789; Marshall, 1962)
in a framework of household behavior by introducing non-household individuals whose
characteristics affect the production of the household’s commodities and which can be
influenced by the actions of the household.
Individual i has a utility function
Ui = Ui(Zi1, ..., Ziq), (1)
where Zij (j = 1, ..., q) are commodities (or wants) consumed by individual i. Each
commodity Zij has a production function
Zij = Zij(xij , tij , ei, Rij1, ..., Rijr), (2)
where xij and tij are, respectively, the individual’s endowment of market goods or ser-
vices and time devoted to the production of commodity j, ei is a measure of the indi-
vidual’s education, experience and other relevant personal and environmental charac-
teristics, and Rijm (m = 1, ..., r) are characteristics of r ‘other’ individuals that impact
upon i’s output of commodity j.
Becker (1974) departs from the traditional model of household production (e.g., see
Michael and Becker, 1973) by allowing Rijm to be influenced by the efforts of individ-
ual i. Hence social interaction investments influence individual i’s social environment
through the characteristics of ‘other’ individuals and these changes are reflected in indi-
vidual i’s utility via its effect on the production of Zij . For the purposes of our current
enquiries it is useful to distinguish between two alternative sets of ‘other’ individuals
whose characteristics affect household production. In the following section we extend
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Becker’s (1974) model accordingly in order to provide a theoretical explanation for two-
way intergenerational transfer of social interaction.
2.2 Intergenerational Transfers of Social Interaction
Like Becker (1974) we begin with a simplified situation in which there is a single com-
modity, Z. However, in terms of factors which affect Z we include the characteristics
of the household’s children in addition to the characteristics of ‘other’ individuals. Es-
sentially, we employ a model in which the household, composed of parents and one or
more children, is separated according to (i) income earners and decisions makers (par-
ents) and (ii) non income earners and non decision makers (children). We distinguish
between the parents and the children with the parents of household i gaining utility Ui
according to Eq. (1) and the children entering parents’ utility through the production
function Eq. (2) in terms of their characteristics which we denote Rc. For clarity, we now
refer to the ‘other’ individuals whose characteristics feature as inputs in i’s production
function in Eq. (2), as ‘non-household’ individuals, and denote their characteristics Rn.
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Whereas Becker (1974) includes a single good x as an input into the production of
Z, we include time. Let:
T = Tw + Tc + Tn, (3)
where Ts (s = c, n) is the time required in the production of Rs, Tw is the time devoted
to work and T is the total available time. An important assumption in our argument
is that Ts incorporates not only time devoted to producing Rs, it also includes time
involved in searching for Rs prospects: hence, we envisage a scenario in which there
is imperfect information over the available production opportunities and so our model
involves search costs.
Maximising utility is now equivalent to maximising the output of commodity Z based
upon the utility-output function:
U = Z(R, T ), (4)
where R is a two-vector. Following Becker (1974), we assume that the characteristics
Rc and Rn have two components:
3
Rs = Rs(Ds, hs), (s = c, n), (5)
where hs is the effect of the parents’ effort on the characteristics of s and Ds is the level
of Rs when the parents make no effort. We assume that Rs is increasing in both its
arguments:
∂Rs
∂gs
> 0, (g = D,h). (6)
Furthermore, we are interested in introducing into the ‘non-household’ characteristics,
Rn, the characteristics of the household’s children. The argument is that the attitude of
non-household individuals towards the parents, Rn, is improving in the level of household
investment in children’s characteristics reflecting, for instance, the social pressure on
2We drop the i and j subscripts henceforth as the meaning should be clear from the context.
3Although we relax the assumption that the components are perfect substitutes.
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being seen to be giving children positive social experiences. To reflect this Eq. (5)
becomes:
Rc = Rc(Dc, hc), (7a)
Rn = Rn(Dn(hc), hn), (7b)
where Dn is increasing and concave in its argument:
D′n(hc) > 0, D
′′
n(hc) < 0. (8)
Hence, parental investment in child social interaction, hc, has a direct positive effect
on child characteristics, Rc, and a further indirect positive effect on ‘non-household’
individuals’ characteristics, Rn.
Eqs. (7a) and (7b) require some explanation in the context of the themes of this
paper. Parents can invest in ‘non-household’ characteristics by raising their own so-
cial interaction level, hn, for example, by increasing their club membership, level of
volunteering and so on. They can also invest in ‘child’ characteristics by raising their
children’s social interaction, for example, by enrolling their children in more clubs and
activities. However, child and non-household characteristics have an autonomous part,
Ds (s = c, n): in the absence of any investment ‘child’ and ‘non-household’ characteris-
tics may be non-zero. (Of course, Ds can be negative: before any investment in hs the
‘social environment’ is negative.) In the case of ‘non-household’ characteristics the term
Dn is quasi-autonomous as it is only constant given changes in hn but, by Eq. (8), is
increasing in hc.
It follows from Eqs. (7a) and (7b) that maximising utility, Eq. (4), can now be
meaningfully expressed in terms of the arguments hn and hc (since Dc is exogenous)
which we represent by the two-vector, h:4
U = U(h). (11)
It is now clear that the input of time Ts required in the production of Rs (s = c, n)
can also be specified in terms of hs, hence Eq. (3) can be written:
Ts = tshs, (s = c, n), (12a)
T = Tw + tchc + tnhn, (12b)
4It is important to note that the dependence of Rn on hc through Dn(hc) in Eq. (7b) is not
inconsistent with Eq. (11) having the usual properties (quasi-concavity in the arguments hc and hn).
We illustrate with the following simple example.
Example 1. Let U(h) = hc.[Dn(hc) + hn], i.e. Dc = 0. The Bordered Hessian for U(.) is given by
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
0 Dn(.) + hcD
′
n
(.) + hn hc
Dn(.) + hcD
′
n
(.) + hn 2D
′
n
(.) + hcD
′′
n
(.) 1
hc 1 0
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
(9)
Quasi-concavity requires that Eq. (9) is non-negative, hence
[2Dn(.) + 2hn]− {h
2
c
D
′′
n
(.)} ≥ 0, (10)
Inspecting Eq. (10), from Eq. (8), {.} < 0. A sufficient condition for (10) to hold is then that [.] > 0
or, in other words, that Dn(.) is not so negative that Rn < 0.
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where ts is the constant time per unit hs.
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One reason for including time in the theoretical framework is to allow us to model
search costs in the pursuit of social interaction activities. We initially allow two factors
to affect search costs. First, we make the argument that parents may have a stock of
knowledge, h˜, about social interaction opportunities which is based upon, say, previous
engagement in social interaction which might include the social interaction of the parents
before they had children or, indeed, earlier experiences of social interaction with younger
siblings. Hence:
Ts = ts(h˜)hs, (s = c, n), (13)
where ts is non-increasing and convex in its argument:
t′s(h˜) ≤ 0, (s = c, n), (14a)
t′′s(h˜) ≥ 0. (14b)
Second, we recognise that the search costs and hence time involved in one period’s
(τ) hs investment, h
τ
s , may be influenced by the search experience relating to hs and
h−s (−s 6= s = c, n) investments in the previous period (τ − 1): h
τ−1
s and h
τ−1
−s . For
simplicity, we consider two periods (τ = 0, 1), hence:6
t0s = t
0
s(h˜), (s = c, n), (15a)
t1s = t
1
s(h
0, h˜), (15b)
where the properties of Eq. (15a) follow directly from Eqs. (14a) and (14b), and t1s is
non-increasing and convex in its arguments:
∂t1s(h
0, h˜)
∂k
≤ 0, (k = h0s, h
0
−s, h˜) (16a)
∂2t1s(h
0, h˜)
∂k2
≥ 0. (16b)
Hence, in the initial period, τ = 0, time devoted to each unit of h0s investment, t
0
s, is a
function of the original stock of parental social interaction knowledge, h˜. In the next
period, τ = 1, time devoted to each unit of h1s investment is a function of the original
stock of parental social interaction knowledge, h˜, and the level of investment in h0s and
h0
−s activities in the previous period (with such investments yielding search cost time-
saving benefits in period τ = 1). We would naturally expect the marginal effect of the
5We assume that the second derivative here is zero for simplicity. Arguably the term could be positive,
reflecting the possibility that additional opportunities for social interaction involve higher search costs or
are less time efficient (i.e. the most time efficient opportunities are selected first), or negative, reflecting
possible time efficiencies or information advantages (reducing search costs) that might result from each
extra unit of hs.
6It is important to make a clear distinction between the roles of h˜ and h0 in t1
s
. The former captures
the impact on search costs of parental knowledge from some time before they had the children whose
characteristics are measured by Rc, whilst the latter captures the impact of social interaction activities
undertaken in some earlier period (τ = 0), in which the characteristics of the children in Rc were taken
into account, upon the search costs incurred in social interaction investments in a later period (τ = 1) in
which the characteristics of the same children are taken into account. To aid clarity in the later analysis,
we resist the temptation to model the latter via allowing h˜ to increase across the two periods.
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h0 elements on t1s to be dependent upon h˜ and vice versa (by Young’s Theorem), in the
following way:
∂2t1s(h
0, h˜)
∂h˜∂h0
≤ 0. (17)
In words, the time-saving effects in terms of reduced search costs for h1s investments due
to period τ = 0 investments are likely to be smaller if the parents have a higher initial
stock of social interaction capital, h˜. At the extreme, if the parents have such a high
stock of capital h˜ that they have full information, then all possible gains from h0s in-
vestments in terms of revealing time-saving information are eliminated and ∂t
1
s
(h0,h˜)
∂h0
= 0.
We now have two time constraints, one for each period that we wish to model. Hence
Eq. (12b), can be written:
T = t0w +
∑
s=c,n
t0s(h˜)h
0
s, (18a)
T = t1w +
∑
s=c,n
t1s(h
0, h˜)h1s. (18b)
In addition to the time constraints, the parents face a budget constraint:
Iτ =
∑
s=c,n
psh
τ
s , (19)
where I is money income and ps is the price of a unit of hs. As is well known, the three
constraints, Eqs. (18a), (18b) and (19), can be collapsed into a single constraint for each
time period:
M = wT + V =
∑
s=c,n
[
wt0s(h˜) + ps
]
h0s, (20a)
M = wT + V =
∑
s=c,n
[
wt1s(h
0, h˜) + ps
]
h1s, (20b)
where w is the time-invariant and constant wage rate, V is time-invariant non-labour
income and M is the household’s ‘full income’ which, assuming for simplicity no saving
or borrowing, is also time-invariant across the two periods.7
We now make the following simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the
characteristics Rs do not exhibit memory over the two periods (there are no reputation
effects: e.g. investments in Rn in period τ = 0 are forgotten by the non-household
individuals in period 1), hence:
Dτc = Dc, (τ = 0, 1), (21a)
Dτn = Dn(h
τ
c ). (21b)
Second, we assume that the search cost benefits for h1s investments due to h
0 investments
are not known to the parents, a priori: hence the maximisation problem is separable
over the two periods.8 Finally, assuming an interior solution (so that hτ > 0), the
maximisation problem can be stated as:
max
h
0
U(h0), s.t. M = w
∑
s=c,n
t0s(h˜)h
0
s +
∑
s=c,n
psh
0
s, (22a)
7See Becker (1965) for a derivation and discussion of ‘full income’.
8This along with the non-borrowing/saving assumption allows us to ignore time discounting without
loss of generality.
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max
h
1
U(h1), s.t. M = w
∑
s=c,n
t1s(h
0, h˜)h1s +
∑
s=c,n
psh
1
s. (22b)
Given that the problem is separable over time, the Lagrangian for the maximisation
problem facing the parents in period τ = 0 is then:9
L(h0) = U(h0) + λ0
[
M − w
∑
s=c,n
t0s(h˜)h
0
s −
∑
s=c,n
psh
0
s
]
. (23)
The relevant first order conditions for an equality constrained maximum are then:10
Lh0
s
(h0) = Uh0
s
(h0)− λ0
[
wt0s(h˜) + ps
]
= 0, (24a)
Lλ0 = M − w
∑
s=c,n
t0s(h˜)h
0
s −
∑
s=c,n
psh
0
s = 0. (24b)
We now address the issue of intergenerational transfer of social interaction from par-
ents to children. First, if the parent’s utility function U = Z(R, T ) places high value on
social interaction, this may be genetically or socially transmitted to the child through a
high valuation of hc in Rc(Dc, hc) - i.e. the standard approach to intergenerational trans-
fer. Second, given Eq. (7b) the parents (decision-makers) can influence non-household
characteristics Rn via investments in their own social interaction activities hn and/or
investments in child social interaction hc, they have an incentive to make hc investments
even if they do not have a large positive impact on the child (i.e. ∂Rc(Dc,hc)
∂hc
is positive
but small). Hence, whilst by Eq. (6) we have ruled out the parents making hc invest-
ments that impact negatively on child characteristics Rc, this (second) line of reasoning
for parent to child intergenerational transfer of social interaction follows either from
the parent’s concern about how they themselves are perceived externally (being seen to
do the ‘right thing’ for their children) or out of a belief that regardless of how low a
value the child places on hc, they (the parents) know what is best and believe that non-
household individuals share the same view (e.g. dance lessons might not be the child’s
chosen activity but the parents and non-household members believe they are beneficial).
In either case, unlike the first argument, hc investments here may not be sustained if
the child was the decision-maker. We now exploit the search cost aspect of our model
to explain a possible third source of parent to child transfer of social interaction: if
the parents have a high initial stock of social interaction capital h˜ this may reduce the
search costs associated with child social interaction investment in period τ = 0, reducing
t0c(h˜), by Eq. (14a), and hence boosting h
0
c . It is straightforward to show that this will
be true if wλ0 ∂t
0
n
(h˜)
∂h˜
[
wt0c(h˜) + pc
]
is not too large relative to wλ0 ∂t
0
c
(h˜)
∂h˜
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]
,
and hence h0n-related search costs due to an increase in h˜ do not fall too fast relative
to h0c-related search costs. To see this, we refer to the first order conditions for period
τ = 0, Eqs. (24a) and (24b). Taking total differentials, forming a Hessian matrix |B|
9Becker (1974) is specifically concerned with the size and behaviour of social income: the sum of
money income and the value of the characteristics of non-household income. Our purpose here is to
examine the behaviour of investments in hs (s = c, n), hence it is sufficient to use money income as the
relevant term in the constraint rather than social income.
10The subscripts hs (s = c, n) and λ denote partial derivatives.
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and using Cramer’s rule, given |B| > 0 for a maximum:
sign
{
∂hc
∂h˜
}
= sign


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
wλ0
∂t0
c
(h˜)
∂h˜
Ucn(h
0) −
[
wt0c(h˜) + pc
]
wλ0
∂t0
n
(h˜)
∂h˜
Unn(h
0) −
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]
w
[
∂t0
n
(h˜)
∂h˜
h0n +
∂t0
c
(h˜)
∂h˜
h0c
]
−
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


(25)
Expansion of the R.H.S. of Eq. (25) yields:
w
(
∂t0n(h˜)
∂h˜
h0n +
∂t0c(h˜)
∂h˜
h0c
){
Unn(h
0)
[
wt0c(h˜) + pc
]
− Ucn(h
0)
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]}
+
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]{
wλ0
∂t0n(h˜)
∂h˜
[
wt0c(h˜) + pc
]
− wλ0
∂t0c(h˜)
∂h˜
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]}
,
(26)
where (.) < 0 and [.] > 0. Eq. (26) is positive as required if wλ0 ∂t
0
n
(h˜)
∂h˜
[
wt0c(h˜) + pc
]
is
not too large relative to wλ0 ∂t
0
c
(h˜)
∂h˜
[
wt0n(h˜) + pn
]
.
We now address the issue of intergenerational transfer of social interaction from
children to parents. Here we again exploit the search cost argument, but this time
relating to period τ = 1 hn investments. The Lagrangian for the maximisation problem
facing the parents in period τ = 1 is:
L(h1) = U(h1) + λ1
[
M − w
∑
s=c,n
t1s(h
0, h˜)h1s −
∑
s=c,n
psh
1
s
]
. (27)
The relevant first order conditions for an equality constrained maximum are then:
Lh1
s
(h1) = Uh1
s
(h1)− λ1
[
wt1s(h
0, h˜) + ps
]
= 0, (s = c, n), (28a)
Lλ1 = M − w
∑
s=c,n
t1s(h
0, h˜)h1s −
∑
s=c,n
psh
1
s = 0. (28b)
We now argue that child to parent intergenerational social interaction effects arise
because parental investment in h0c provides information about parental opportunities
for h1n investment reducing the associated search costs, t
1
n(h
0, h˜), by Eq. (16a). It is
straightforward to show that this will be true if wλ1 ∂t
1
n
(h0,h˜)
∂h0
c
[
wt1c(h
0, h˜) + pc
]
is not too
small relative to wλ1 ∂t
1
c
(h0,h˜)
∂h0
c
[
wt1n(h
0, h˜) + pn
]
, and hence h1c-related search costs due
to an increase in h0c do not fall too fast relative to h
1
n-related search costs. To see this,
we refer to the first order conditions for period τ = 1, Eqs. (28a) and (28b). Taking
total differentials, forming a Hessian matrix |B| and using Cramer’s rule, given |B| > 0
for a maximum:
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Expansion of the R.H.S. of Eq. (29) yields:
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where (.) < 0 and [.] > 0. Eq. (30) is positive as required if wλ1 ∂t
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.
Given Eq. (17), we conclude that this child to parent transfer of social interaction
is more likely to occur if h˜ is small (hence imperfect information keeps the search costs
for h0s high, presenting opportunities for heavy reductions in period τ = 1 search costs
due to period τ = 0 social interaction investments) and hc plays a dominant role in the
parent’s utility-output function, hence even if the search costs make h0n investments pro-
hibitively expensive, h0c investments, though incurring heavy time penalties, are valued
too highly not to undertake. This is consistent with the idea that parents with small
children may face heavy social pressure, or attach great value, to their children gain-
ing social interaction. But then having undertaken h0c investments, it is possible that
associated information gains help to reduce the search costs to future h1s investments,
completing the argument.
Against this, however, since hc appears in Rn, any increase in hc will reduce, at no
additional cost, the level of hn required to achieve a given level of Rn, and this will tend
to reduce the level of hn investment.
We conclude that the following channels support parent to child intergenerational
social interaction: (i) the parent’s utility function U = Z(R, T ) places high value on
social interaction and this is genetically or socially transmitted to the child, (ii) parents
make social interaction investments for their children to be seen to be doing the ‘right
thing’ or based, not on what they intrinsically value for themselves, but what they
believe to be ‘right’ for the well-being of their children, and (iii) parents have a high
stock of social interaction capital h˜ which reduces the search costs associated with child
social interaction investment. On the other hand, child to parent intergenerational social
interaction effects arise because parental investment in h0c provides information about
parental opportunities for h1n investment reducing the associated search costs.
3 Data and Methodology
In the remaining sections of the paper, we explore the relationship between the social
interaction of parents and their children from an empirical perspective. In order to
explore the robustness of our findings, the empirical analysis employs four data sets:
two for Great Britain, namely the National Child Development Study (NCDS ) and the
British Cohort Study (BCS ); and two for the U.S., the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY ). Both the NCDS
and BCS are cohort specific studies with the former tracking individuals born in a par-
ticular week in 1958, whilst the more recent cohort study, the BCS, tracks individuals
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born in a particular week in 1970. For the U.S., the PSID is a nationally representative
panel of individuals ongoing since 1968 conducted at the Institute for Social Research,
University of Michigan with the latest wave being in 2007. Finally, the NLSY is a na-
tionally representative survey sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Labor, which, since 1979, has a panel aspect, focusing on gathering in-
formation on individuals between the ages of 14 and 22. The four data sets, which
provide a wealth of information relating to family background, are ideally suited to our
purposes since in each data set it is possible to link parents to their offspring allowing
us to explore whether intergenerational associations exist between the social interaction
of parents and their offspring.
In the NCDS in 1991, when the respondent (i.e. parent) was aged 33, a random
sample of one in three of the parents’ children were sampled. Matching parents with
their offspring leads to a sample size of 1,943, after missing cases, with the average age
of the children being 9 years old. For the BCS in 2004, when the respondents were
aged 34, their children were surveyed yielding a sample size of 1,290, after allowing for
missing values, with the average age of the children being 12 years old. In the PSID,
there is information on the children of the respondents available from the Child Develop-
ment Study (CDS ) in 1997, 2002 and 2005, which aims to provide information on early
human capital formation. In terms of our analysis, we analyse child characteristics in
200211 yielding a matched sample of 1,375 observations, where the average age of the
children is 14 years old. Finally, the NLSY allows us to investigate whether any social
interaction linkage exists across generations by matching female respondents from the
NLSY 1979 with their offspring in 2002, yielding a sample of 1,070 observations, where
the average age of the children is 15 years.
In accordance with the small number of related studies in this area as discussed in
Section 1, we initially model the social interaction of the ith child (i = 1, .., n), SOCchild,
as a function of the social interaction of the jth parent (j = 1, ..,m), SOCparent, where
the social interaction of both parent and child are measured concurrently, i.e. at time
period T1:
SOCchildi,T1 = X
′β1 + γSOC
parent
j,T1 + ε1. (31)
We then expand this framework by jointly modelling the social interaction of the ith
child SOCchild and the social interaction of his/her parent as a function of the social
interaction of the parent and child, respectively, as follows:
SOCchildi,T1 = X
′β1 + γSOC
parent
j,T1 + ε1, (32a)
SOC
parent
j,T1 = Z
′β2 + φSOC
child
i,T1 + ε2. (32b)
Modelling the two outcomes within a bivariate framework allows interdependence be-
tween the two equations. Specifically, ε1 and ε2 are the stochastic disturbance terms
where ε1, ε2 ∼ N(0, 0, σ
2
1, σ
2
2, ρ) and the covariance is given by σ12 = ρσ1σ2. If ρ 6= 0
then joint estimation is characterised by greater efficiency. Finally, the extent of inter-
dependence between the social interaction of parents and their offspring is captured by
the estimated parameters γ and φ.
11The year 2002 is chosen for modelling reasons so that there is a timing difference between when the
social interaction of the parent and child social interaction are measured in order to reduce the potential
for reverse causality, see below.
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A major advantage of the data that we employ is that it is generally possible to take
account of the fact that individuals are followed over time to allow timing differences
in the measures of social interaction. In the empirical analysis that follows we focus on
the following approach:
SOCchildi,T1 = X
′β1 + γSOC
parent
j,T2 + ε1, (33a)
SOC
parent
j,T3 = Z
′β2 + φSOC
child
i,T4 + ε2. (33b)
where T1 > T2 and T3 > T4. This approach reduces the potential for reverse causality
since, as argued by Angrist and Pischke (2009), the social interaction of the child (par-
ent) is measured ex ante, that is, it predates the outcome variable, i.e. parental (child)
social interaction.
With respect to the specific definitions of the dependent variables, in the NCDS
and NLSY, the dependent variable SOCchild is defined as a binary indicator of whether
the child is a member of a club. Specifically, in the NCDS, this is measured in 1991
(T1=1991 in Eq. (33a)) and in the NLSY this is measured in 2002 (T1=2002). In the
NCDS, the binary indicator for whether the child is a member of a club is based on
parents’ responses to the following question “does your child get any special lessons (for
example musical) or belong to any organisations that encourage activities such as sport,
music, art, dance, drama etc?” For the NLSY commencing in 1986, for the children of
female respondents, it is possible to investigate whether the child belonged to a club,
either in or out of school, between the ages of 10 to 14. Specifically, a binary social
interaction measure is based on the child’s responses to the following questions “do you
belong to any clubs or organizations not sports-related, either in or out of school?” and
“do you belong to any sports teams, clubs, or organized sports activities, either in or
out of school?” In terms of the NCDS and the NLSY, the social interaction of the child
is modelled via a probit specification, i.e. exploring the determinants of the probabil-
ity of club membership. For both the BCS and the PSID, we construct an index of
the number of clubs that the child attends. Specifically in the BCS, this is measured
in 2004 (i.e. T1=2004 in Eq. (33a)) and, in the PSID, this is measured in 2002 (i.e.
T1=2002). In the BCS, the number of clubs that the child attends ranges from zero to
three or more clubs. This measure is constructed from the child’s responses to whether
they attended a youth club, scouts or guides, a sports club or lessons, a party, or some
other unspecified event. The measure of SOCchild in the PSID is also an ordered index
ranging from zero clubs to attending four or more clubs, constructed from the child’s
responses in the CDS 2002 to the following questions: “in the past 12 months, did you
participate in religious clubs and activities?”; “during the past 12 months, did you spend
time on social activities such as clubs or student government?”; “were you a member
of any groups in the community such as scouts or hobby clubs in the last 12 months?”;
“did you spend time on volunteer service activities over the last 12 months?”; “dur-
ing last summer, were you involved in any organised summer or after-school sports or
recreational programmes?”; and, finally, “were you a member of any athletic or sports
teams at school in the last 12 months?” For both the BCS and the PSID, the dependent
variable, SOCchild , is modelled as an ordered probit specification, i.e. exploring the
determinants of the probability of being a member of zero clubs, one club, through to
three (four) or more clubs.
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In both the NCDS and the BCS, parental social interaction is modelled as an ordered
probit specification, where the dependent variable is an ordered index of the number of
clubs that the parent is a member of. Specifically, in the NCDS, this is measured in
1991 and 2000 (T3=1991 or 2000 in Eq. (33b)) whilst, in the BCS, this is measured
in 2004 (T3=2004). The different types of club include active current membership of:
a political party; an environmental charity/voluntary group; other charity/voluntary
group; women’s groups, townswomen’s guild or women’s institute; parents/school orga-
nizations; tenants/residents association; and/or trade union/staff associations. In the
PSID, parental social interaction is proxied by information on voluntary activity under-
taken in the calendar year 2004 (i.e. T3=2004) and is measured as follows: firstly, by
the probability of volunteering for unpaid work, ranging from never (0) through to daily
(3); secondly, by the number of times that the individual volunteered during the year
(0 through to 100 times); and, finally, by the number of hours volunteered (0 to 2,920).
For the NLSY, the number of weeks that the parent undertook unpaid voluntary work is
the measure of social interaction in 2005 (T3=2005). In both of the U.S. data sets, with
the exception of the probability of volunteering, the dependent variable is essentially a
non-negative integer count and, hence, it is modelled via a negative binomial model in
order to take into account the over dispersion of zeros. It is not modelled by OLS since
the tails of the distributions would not be accurately predicted. The summary statistics
relating to the dependent variables are presented in Table 1A.
As detailed in Eqs. (31), (32), (33a) and (33b) above, with respect to the explana-
tory variables, the empirical specification also allows parental (child) social interaction
to be an explanatory variable in the child (parent) social interaction equation in order to
ascertain the existence or otherwise of an intergenerational relationship. The following
discussion focuses initially upon specifications where the child outcome is the dependent
variable. In the NCDS, parental social interaction is measured by the number of clubs
attended in 1991 (T2=1991) and also in 1981 (T2=1981) entered into the empirical
specification as a set of binary controls, i.e. a member of one club, two or three clubs
or four or more clubs, with no clubs as the reference category and is as defined above.
The timing difference between the outcome variable and the parent’s social interaction,
when measured in 1981, reduces the potential for reverse causality since SOCparent is
measured ex ante, i.e. T1 > T2. We are also able to analyse a timing differential in
the BCS, where the number of clubs (as defined above) is entered as a binary control,
i.e. one club, two or more clubs, with no club attendance as the reference category.
The measurement of SOCparent is in 2000 (T2=2000). Similarly, for the U.S., in the
PSID and NLSY timing differences can be exploited. Specifically, in the PSID, the
number of clubs that the parent was a member of in 1997 (T2=1997) is entered into
the SOCchild equation where the outcome variable is measured in 2002. For the NLSY,
binary controls are adopted for whether the parent was a member of a club during high
school (i.e. T1 > T2). In both U.S. data sets, the number of clubs attended by the
parent in 1997 is entered as a set of binary controls, i.e. a member of one club, two
or three clubs, and four or more clubs, with no club attendance as the reference category.
Turning to the case where the parent outcome is the dependent variable, for the
NCDS (BCS ) SOCchild is entered as a binary control for whether the child is a member
of a club in 1991 (2004), i.e. T3 > T4 (T3 = T4 in the BCS ). In the U.S., for the PSID,
SOCchild is measured as the number of clubs attended in 2002 (T3 > T4) and is entered
as a set of binary variables, one club, two or three clubs, or four or more clubs, where no
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club attendance by the child is the reference category. Finally, in the NLSY, SOCchild
is measured by whether the child was a club member in 2002, where again T3 > T4. For
each data set, the variables are defined from the same survey questions used to define
the outcome variables.12 Summary statistics for SOCchild and SOCparent when used as
control variables are given in Table 1B.
A range of additional covariates are employed where X and Z denote vectors of ex-
planatory variables in the child and parent social interaction equations, respectively.
In the child’s social interaction equation, variables in X consist of child covariates
and parental characteristics. In particular, the child covariates are binary controls for
whether the child: is male; is in good health; has any siblings; lives in a single parent
family; and is white. A quadratic in the age of the child is included along with the
number of schools that the child has attended, the number of friends that the child has
and the number of books owned by the child. Parental controls, Z, entered into the
child social interaction equation include binary indicators for whether the parent: is
male; educational attainment13; and housing tenure, specifically for whether the house
is owned outright or on a mortgage. We also control for household finances by includ-
ing the natural logarithm of benefits, non labour income and labour income.14 Finally
regional controls are also included.
For the parent’s social interaction equation, control variables in Z are parent charac-
teristics, some of which are also covariates in the child social interaction equation. The
variables in Z consist of binary indicators for whether the parent: is white; is married;
is male; highest educational attainment (as defined above); housing tenure; attends re-
ligious services; and works more a 45 hour week or more. Other controls include: the
number of adults in the household; the number of children in the household; controls for
household finances (as defined above); the frequency that the family eats together; and
the frequency that the family sees their relatives (specifically those living outside the
household). In the U.S. data sets, it is possible to also include a quadratic in the age
of the parent since the data is not cohort specific. Finally, we include a set of regional
controls. Summary statistics for both sets of covariates, X and Z, are provided in Table
1C and full definitions are given in Table A1.
12Ideally, individuals and their offspring would be tracked over time in each data set which would
then enable the use of a panel data modelling approach in order to control for time invariant unobserved
fixed effects. Limited data availability unfortunately precludes this approach.
13In the NCDS and BCS, educational attainment is defined as highest level of educational attainment:
degree (undergraduate or postgraduate); diploma level, nursing or teaching qualification; Advanced (A)
level and Ordinary (O) level. O’ level qualifications are taken after eleven years of formal compulsory
schooling and approximate to the U.S. honours high school curriculum. The A’ level qualification is a
public examination taken by 18 year olds over a two year period studying between one to four subjects
and is the main determinant of eligibility for entry to higher education in the UK. No education is the
reference category. In the U.S., for the NLSY, three binary indicators are used to measure the highest
level of education attained, specifically completed high school; completed some college; and attained a
degree (undergraduate or postgraduate). Less than high school completion is the reference category. In
the PSID, educational attainment is measured as a continuous variable by years of completed schooling.
14In the NLSY, family finances are measured by the natural logarithm of family income as it is not
possible to decompose income into the constituent elements in 2002 due to missing values.
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4 Results
As discussed in the introduction, the majority of the economics literature in this area
has focused upon the concepts of social capital and trust rather than specifically on so-
cial interaction. Furthermore, the empirical evidence has concentrated on the influence
of parental social capital upon the social capital of their offspring, e.g. Okumura and
Usui (2010). The only exception which we are aware of is Duncan et al. (2005) who
analyse mother-daughter correlations between participation in school clubs, across gen-
erations using the U.S. NLSY. However, they do not investigate bi-directional influences
in social interaction between parents and their offspring. Analysing correlations is the
starting point for our empirical analysis whereby we estimate Eq. (31) based upon the
British NCDS exploring the influence of parental social interaction upon the probability
that their child is a member of a club. This is estimated as a univariate probit model
with the results shown in Table 2 Panel A. Older children clearly have a higher proba-
bility of being a member of a club in 1991, whilst there are no gender or ethnicity effects.
However, the number of close friends that the child has and the number of books
owned by the child both have positive and significant impacts upon the probability of
child club membership, where the latter is a potential proxy for home resources. Parental
influences are dominated by the effect of the highest educational qualification obtained
by 1991, where a child whose parent has a degree as their highest academic qualification
(relative to no education) has a 17 percentage point higher probability of being a club
member. Income effects are small and stem from household labour income. The number
of clubs that the parent is a member of is as equally important as parental education in
terms of magnitude, whereby a child whose parent is a member of four or more clubs
(relative to no clubs) has a 22 percentage point higher probability of club membership.
A possible concern with the analysis thus far is reverse causality and ideally we would
either instrument parental social interaction or measure it ex ante, so that the primary
explanatory variable of interest predates the outcome variable.15 The latter is possible
in the NCDS and, hence, in Table 2 Panel B, we measure parental club membership in
1981 and child club membership in 1991, i.e. in terms of Eq. (33a) T1 > T2. The results
are consistent with those in Panel A, where the membership of clubs across generations
is measured concurrently, with a monotonic relationship being evident, i.e. the extent
of the social interaction of the parent matters.
We now depart from the approach adopted in the existing empirical literature and
explore the prediction from the theoretical framework presented in Section 2 that the
social interaction of the child may also influence that of their parents. This might occur
through spillover effects by reducing search costs whereby parents become involved in
social events, i.e. investment in hc provides information about parental opportunities
for hn (see Section 2.2). In what follows, the empirical analysis allows the causality to
operate in both directions. Specifically, the social interaction of the child and that of the
parent are modelled simultaneously, see Eqs. (33a) and (33b). Table 2 Panel D reports
the results of modelling the probability that the child is a member of a club conditional
upon the same covariates as in Panel A and binary controls for the number of clubs that
the parent is a member of in 1981 (i.e. T1 > T2). The results are in line with those
reported in Panels A and B indicating that parental social interaction has a statistically
15Given the difficulty in identifying suitable instruments, we do not pursue the instrumentation of
parental social interaction.
16
significant impact on their offspring’s social interaction.
We now focus on the effect of the children’s social interaction on their parent’s so-
cial interaction, which has largely been neglected in the literature. The corresponding
parental outcome, jointly estimated with their child’s social interaction (see Table 2
Panel C), is shown in the first column of Table 3. Clearly, the value of the correlation
coefficient, ρ, is statistically significant endorsing the joint modelling approach. Initially,
the number of clubs that the parent is a member of is measured in 1991, i.e. at the same
time as that of the child’s club membership (T3 = T4 in Eq. (33b)). We show outcomes
for the probability that the parent is a member of no clubs and for the probability that
the parent is a member of four or more clubs in 1991. The number of adults in the
household serves to lower the probability of the parent being a member of no clubs
and may proxy household resources to care for children when the parent is socialising.
In terms of our theoretical model, this stems from reducing the costs associated with
parental social interaction, hn, by reducing child care costs, i.e. through a reduction
in pn, see Section 2. The influence of education is apparent and, where statistically
significant, is monotonically associated with a lower probability of not being a member
of any clubs culminating in around 21 percentage points for those parents with a degree
as their highest qualification (relative to those with no education). The significant pos-
itive correlation between social interaction and education is consistent with the existing
empirical evidence to date, e.g. Glaeser et al. (2002). The influence of income is rela-
tively small and only labour income influences the probability of the parent attending
no clubs (four or more clubs) by around -2 (0.6) percentage points. As found with the
social interaction of the child, there are no gender or ethnicity effects.
Controlling for the social network of the family by including the frequency that
the family (i.e. household members) eat together and see relatives (i.e. outside of the
household) has no influence upon the parents’ club membership. The extent to which
the parent may be able to become involved in social interaction outside of the family
environment may be hindered by the amount of time that they have available for so-
cial activities outside work. However, including a binary control for whether the parent
works a 45 hour week or more has no influence on the probability of not being a member
of a club and only around a 2.7 percentage point association with decreasing the prob-
ability of being a member of four or more clubs. Focusing upon the primary covariate
of interest, whether the respondent’s child is a member of a club in 1991 reduces the
probability that the parent is a member of no clubs by around 42 percentage points
and increases the probability of being a member of four or more clubs by 8.4 percentage
points. This is an effect over and above social interaction within the family and social
interaction related to attendance at religious services.16
The NCDS allows us to reduce the potential for reverse causality in the parent so-
cial interaction equation by measuring the child’s social interaction ex ante, specifically
by focusing upon the same definition of parental club membership but in 2000, i.e. in
16There is a growing literature on the economics of religion and its association with a variety of
economic outcomes such as education (see Iannaccone, 1998). In the empirical analysis, our aim is
to investigate social interaction which arises over and above that stemming from attending religious
services. Furthermore, attending religious services would potentially dominate other types of social
interaction especially for the U.S. where, on average, in the PSID and NLSY approximately 70 per cent
of parents attended religious services, see Table 1C.
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terms of Eq. (33b), T3 > T4. The results relating to the determinants of the probability
that the child is a member of a club, shown in Table 2 Panel D, are largely unaltered.
Focusing upon the corresponding parental social interaction results, in the second col-
umn of Table 3, where social interaction is now measured in 2000, there are a couple
of notable differences. Firstly, there is a significant gender differential in that males are
approximately 5.8 percentage points less likely than females not to be a member of any
clubs. Secondly, the frequency that the family visits relatives has a statistically signifi-
cant positive impact upon the likelihood of not being a member of any clubs, potentially
implying that social interaction inside the family might be a substitute for social inter-
action outside of the family environment. The amount of leisure time available to the
parent now has a relatively large effect on the probability of not being a member of any
clubs, where those who work long hours are more likely not to attend clubs. However,
the primary result that the social interaction of the child is positively associated with
the extent of the social interaction of the parent remains robust.
The results based upon the British NCDS are arguably cohort specific since the
empirical analysis focused on the social interaction of the parent when aged either 33
or 42. To investigate this further, we make use of the more recent BCS cohort data.
Furthermore, the measurement of the child’s club membership in 2004 in the BCS is
more detailed than that of the NCDS, as detailed in Section 3 above. The results of
estimating a bivariate ordered probit as in Eqs. (33a) and (33b) are shown in Table
4, for the child’s social interaction, and Table 5, for the parent’s social interaction.17
Focusing upon the child outcome in 2004, parental social interaction is measured in
2000 so T1 > T2. As compared to the results from the NCDS, the gender and ethnicity
of the child are now statistically significant, although the summary statistics in Table
1C reveal similar mean characteristics. Whether the child is in good health reduces
(increases) the probability of not being a member of a club (being a member of three or
more clubs) by about 4.7 (4.2) percentage points. As found in the NCDS, the number
of friends and the number of books that the child has are both positively associated
with the extent of their club membership. The influence of parental characteristics is
less evident in that there are no effects from the gender of the parent or income. If the
parent belongs to two or more clubs in 2000 (relative to being a member of no clubs)
then the probability that their child is a member of three or more clubs increases by 10
percentage points. Hence, the underlying results related to the child’s social interaction
do not appear to be cohort specific.
Turning to the social interaction of the parent in Table 5, it is not possible to model
the parental outcome at a different time to the measurement of their offspring’s social
interaction due to data restrictions, hence T3 = T4. There are some differences in
comparison to the results based on the NCDS in that ethnicity is clearly important, as
are the number of children in the household rather than the number of adults in the
household, and social interaction within the household (as proxied by the frequency the
family eats together) all serve to increase the probability that the parent is a member of
four or more clubs. However, the underlying result that there is a positive relationship
between the social interaction of the child and that of the parent is also apparent in the
BCS, where the extent of the child’s club membership does not seem to be important.
Specifically, whether the child is a member of one, two or three or more clubs in 2004
17The bivariate ordered probit approach is based on Sajaia (2008).
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(relative to no clubs) is associated with around a 10 percentage point increase in the
probability that the parent is a member of four or more clubs. As found with the NCDS,
the joint modelling approach of social interaction across generations yields an efficiency
gain and suggests interdependence between the social interaction of parents and their
offspring.
So far our empirical analysis supports the existence of bi-directional social interac-
tion effects across generations, which is consistent with our theoretical priors discussed
in Section 2. We now further explore the robustness of these findings by investigating
two U.S. datasets. Whilst, in both the PSID and NLSY, the social interaction of the
child is measured in a similar fashion to that in the NCDS and the BCS, namely by the
number of clubs and the probability of being a member of a club, the measurement of
parental social interaction is arguably more comprehensive in the U.S. data sets. This is
because, as well as being able to measure the number of clubs that a parent is a member
of, information is also available upon the number of hours spent in a particular social
activity. In addition, in what follows for both the PSID and NLSY, we take advantage of
timing differences in the measurement of social interaction, so as to reduce the potential
for reverse causality in estimating Eqs. (33a) and (33b), i.e. T1 > T2 and T3 > T4.
Focusing upon the PSID, the social interaction of the child is proxied by the number
of clubs they were a member of in 2002 and this is modelled with the same covariates
X and Z as employed in the British data sets. Following the analysis of the British
data sets, the initial measure of parental social interaction consists of binary controls
for whether the parent was a member of one, two/three clubs, or four or more clubs in
1997. The results relating to the child outcome are shown in Table 6 Panel A. There are
some interesting differences in comparison to the British data sets. For example, older
children are more likely to attend more clubs, whereas the opposite was found when
considering the BCS.18 This might be because, on average, children are slightly older
in the U.S. data sets, see Table 1C. Another difference is that the gender of the child
is important: males are approximately 4 (5.5) percentage points less (more) likely not
to attend (attend four or more) clubs. In contrast to the British evidence, the social
network of the child, as indicated by the number of friends they have, has no influ-
ence upon the likelihood of club membership. There are no effects from the education
of the parent and income effects, where statistically significant, are small in terms of
magnitude. However, as in the BCS, whether the parent owns their home is positively
associated with the probability of the child being a club member, where housing tenure
may provide a proxy for the stock of wealth. As found with the British data sets, and
consistent with our theoretical framework presented in Section 2, the extent of the social
interaction of the parent has a positive influence upon their offspring’s social interaction.
Specifically, whether the parent is a member of four or more clubs in 1997 increases the
probability that their child is a member of four or more clubs in 2002 by approximately
10 percentage points.
The corresponding parental outcome is shown in Table 7 Panel A, where the proba-
bility that the parent volunteers for unpaid work in 2005 is modelled conditional upon
the social interaction of the child in 2002, i.e. T3 > T4. The results are similar to those
found using the British data sets in that there is an effect of the child’s social interac-
18It should be noted that the types of clubs that the child is a member of differ across the BCS and
PSID.
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tion over and above the inclusion of controls for intra household social interaction and
religious activities. The extent of the club membership of the child has a monotonic
association with parental social interaction, where for a parent whose child is a mem-
ber of four or more clubs, this culminates in an 8 percentage point higher probability
of volunteering daily. The correlation in the error terms is statistically insignificant in
the PSID and, hence, in what follows, each equation of the model (33a) and (33b) is
estimated via a univariate framework.19
As mentioned above, one advantage of the PSID is that it is possible to examine
the extent of the parents’ club involvement. Focusing initially on the children’s social
interaction as the outcome variable, the probability of being a member of four or more
clubs is increasing in the number of hours that the parent spends in clubs during 1991,
see Table 6 Panel B. Given that the average number of hours that the parent volunteered
in 1997 is three hours, based on this mean, this effect increases the probability that the
child is a member of four or more clubs in 2002 by over 3 percentage points. In terms
of the parental outcome, we consider the number of hours volunteered in 2004, (Table
7 Panel B), and the number of times the parent volunteered in 2004, (Table 7 Panel
C), conditional upon the child’s social interaction in 2002 (i.e. T3 > T4). The results
reveal a positive association between the extent of the child’s club membership and the
time that the parent spends in unpaid voluntary work during 2004. In particular, if
the child is a member of four or more clubs in 2002 then the parent volunteers an ad-
ditional hour of their time (see Panel B) or volunteered an additional time (see Panel C).
In the final dataset, the NLSY, in contrast to the other three data sets, the sample
of parents are all mothers. The child’s social interaction is modelled as the probability
of being a member of a club in 2002. Clearly, as in the results for the other three data
sets, the age of the child matters in that the likelihood of club membership is increas-
ing in age, albeit at a decreasing rate. Whilst there is no influence from the number
of friends that the child has, the number of books owned is positively associated with
the probability of club membership. Whether the child lives in a single parent family
reduces the probability of club membership by 4 percentage points, which is an effect
over and above family income. Whether the parent was a member of a club during their
high school years, hence T1 > T2, has a monotonic influence on the child’s probability
of club attendance. In particular, if the mother attended four or more clubs during high
school then the child is around 6.5 percentage points more likely to be a club member in
2002. Turning to the parent’s social interaction, we focus on the number of weeks that
the parent undertook unpaid voluntary work in 2005. Mothers whose highest level of
educational attainment was a degree (relative to not completing high school) are more
likely to undertake voluntary work as are older individuals. Clearly, the mother’s social
interaction within the family and social interaction with relatives outside of the house-
hold are both important in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. Whether
the mother’s child was a member of a club in 2002 has a similar influence in terms
of magnitude as attending religious services, increasing the number of weeks that the
parent undertook voluntary work by around a half, i.e. 3.5 days. To summarise, across
the four data sets, we find convincing empirical evidence supporting a bi-directional
relationship between the social interaction of parents and their offspring. Furthermore,
this relationship exists in the U.S. and Great Britain and is robust across a range of
19This is also the case for the NLSY.
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measures of social interaction.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have explored the relationship between the social interaction of parents
and their offspring from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Our theoretical
framework established possible explanations for the intergenerational transfer of social
interaction whereby the social interaction of the parent may influence that of their off-
spring and vice versa. The empirical evidence, based on four data sets covering both
Britain and the U.S., is supportive of our theoretical priors. We find robust evidence
of intergenerational links between the social interaction of parents and their offspring,
which is consistent with the findings of Duncan et al. (2005) and Okumura and Usui
(2010). Moreover, these links exist over and above an extensive set of controls cover-
ing family background such as income and wealth, intra family social interaction and
attendance at religious services. Our empirical evidence indicates that higher levels of
social interaction of the parent (child) results in higher levels of social interaction of
the child (parent). Hence, it would appear that positive bi-directional intergenerational
effects exist in social interaction. Our findings contribute more generally to the existing
literature on intergenerational economic outcomes, such as earnings (e.g Solon, 1999),
formal educational outcomes (e.g. Blanden et al., 2007) and test scores (e.g. Brown et al.,
2011).
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics - Dependent Variables
AVERAGE
NCDS BCS PSID NLSY
Child outcome SOCchildi,T1
Member of a club in 1991 {0, 1} (T1=1991) 0.63 - - -
Number of clubs a member of in 2004 {0,≥ 3} (T1=2004) - 1.46 - -
Number of clubs a member of in 2002 {0,≥ 4} (T1=2002) - - 2.09 -
Member of a club in 2002 {0, 1} (T1=2002) - - - 0.25
Parent outcome SOC
parent
j,T3
Number of clubs a member of in 1991 {0,≥ 3} (T3=1991) 1.01 - - -
Number of clubs a member of in 2000 {0,≥ 3} (T3=2000) 0.77 - - -
Number of clubs a member of in 2004 {0,≥ 4} (T3=2004) - 1.40 - -
Voluntary work in 2005 {0 = never, 3 = daily} (T3=2004) - - 0.66 -
Number of times volunteered in 2005 {0, 100} (T3=2004) - - 2.25 -
Number of hours volunteered in 2005 {0, 2920} (T3=2004) - - 69.34 -
Number of weeks volunteered in 2006 {0, 52} (T3=2005) - - - 6.05
OBSERVATIONS 1,943 1,290 1,375 1,070
Table 1B: Summary Statistics - Social Interaction Independent Variables
AVERAGE
NCDS BCS PSID NLSY
Child outcome, parental social interaction SOC
parent
j,T2
Member of 1 club in 1991 {0, 1} (T2=1991) 0.36 - - -
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1991 {0, 1} (T2=1991) 0.23 - - -
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1991 {0, 1} (T2=1991) 0.03 - - -
Member of 1 club in 1981 {0, 1} (T2=1981) 0.31 - - -
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1981 {0, 1} (T2=1981) 0.23 - - -
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1981 {0, 1} (T2=1981) 0.03 - - -
Member of 1 club in 2000 {0, 1} (T2=2000) - 0.23 - -
Member of 2 or more clubs in 2000 {0, 1} (T2=2000) - 0.05 - -
Member of 1 club in 1997 {0, 1} (T2=1997) - - 0.26 -
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1997 {0, 1} (T2=1997) - - 0.23 -
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1997 {0, 1} (T2=1997) - - 0.07 -
Member of 1 club in high school {0, 1} - - - 0.25
Member of 2-3 clubs in high school {0, 1} - - - 0.28
Member of 4 or more clubs in high school {0, 1} - - - 0.05
Parent outcome, child social interaction SOCchildj,T4
Member of a club in 1991 {0, 1} (T4=1991) 0.63 - - -
Member of 1 club in 2004 {0, 1} (T4=2004) - 0.39 - -
Member of 2 clubs in 2004 {0, 1} (T4=2004) - 0.27 - -
Member of 3 or more clubs in 2004 {0, 1} (T4=2004) - 0.18 - -
Member of 1 club in 2002 {0, 1} (T4=2002) - - 0.21 -
Member of 2-3 clubs in 2002 {0, 1} (T4=2002) - - 0.44 -
Member of 4 or more clubs in 2002 {0, 1} (T4=2002) - - 0.20 -
Member of a club in 2002 {0, 1} (T4=2002) - - - 0.25
OBSERVATIONS 1,943 1,290 1,375 1,070
23
Table 1C: Summary Statistics - Independent Variables
AVERAGE
NCDS BCS PSID NLSY
Child characteristics
Age of child (X) 9.19 11.91 14.11 14.75
Age of child age squared (X) 92.28 114.99 205.60 223.85
Male (X) 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.52
Child in good health (X) 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.39
Child has siblings (X) 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.53
Number of schools child attended (X) 1.72 1.90 1.52 1.41
Number of friends child has (X) 3.52 1.89 3.81 1.75
Number of books owned by child (X) 3.80 3.97 3.65 1.43
Child in single parent family (X) 0.45 0.20 0.46 0.49
White (X) 0.96 0.93 0.51 0.56
Parent characteristics
Age of parent (X, Z)♯ - - 45.89 24.99
Age of parent squared (X, Z) - - 2168.73 626.53
Male (X, Z) 0.32 0.19 0.69 -
O levels highest qualification (X, Z) 0.38 0.28 - -
A levels highest qualification (X, Z) 0.10 0.04 - -
Diploma highest qualification (X, Z) 0.11 0.10 - -
Degree highest qualification (X, Z) 0.05 0.03 - -
Number of years of schooling (X, Z) - - 12.83 -
High school highest qualification (X, Z) - - 0.69
College highest qualification (X, Z) - - 0.05
Degree highest qualification (X, Z) - - 0.09
Log benefits (X, Z) 3.37 4.92 1.16 -
Log non labour income (X, Z) 1.55 3.94 1.10 -
Log labour income (X, Z) 3.37 5.34 7.88 -
Log net family income (X, Z) - - - 9.04
Own house, outright or mortgaged (X, Z) 0.68 0.58 0.70 0.37
Number of adults in household (Z) 1.97 1.87 2.28 2.45
Number of children in household (Z) 2.43 2.68 1.82 1.81
Whether attend religious service (Z) 0.37 0.15 0.79 0.67
Frequency family eats together (Z) 1.73 1.70 2.58 0.36
Frequency family see relatives (Z) 2.21 0.86 0.70 0.84
Parent works ≥ 45 hrs per week (Z) 0.34 0.13 0.26 0.06
Married (Z) 0.82 0.57 0.64 0.51
White (Z) 0.96 0.95 0.55 0.68
OBSERVATIONS 1,943 1,290 1,375 1,070
♯ All parents in the NCDS (BCS ) are 33 in 1991 (34 in 2004), there is no variation
as the data is cohort specific, hence age is not included as a covariate.
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Table 2: Great Britain (NCDS) - Probability Child is a Member of a Club in 1991
CHILD OUTCOME 1991 -
probability club member
PANEL A M.E. TSTAT
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.1049 (5.35)
Age of child age squared -0.0063 (5.98)
Male -0.0269 (1.18)
Child in good health -0.0036 (0.11)
Child has siblings 0.0489 (1.19)
Number of schools child attended 0.0088 (0.60)
Number of friends child has 0.0151 (1.98)
Number of books owned by child 0.0188 (1.92)
Child in single parent family 0.0842 (2.96)
White 0.0809 (1.26)
Parent characteristics
Male 0.0479 (1.51)
O levels highest qualification 0.1369 (5.35)
A levels highest qualification 0.1323 (3.68)
Diploma highest qualification 0.2006 (6.12)
Degree highest qualification 0.1692 (3.40)
Log benefits -0.0028 (0.25)
Log non labour income -0.0117 (1.51)
Log labour income -0.0106 (2.01)
Own house 0.0142 (0.20)
Member of 1 club in 1991 0.0641 (2.47)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1991 0.1489 (5.17)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1991 0.2173 (3.69)
LR chi squared (32) 251.27 p=[0.000]
PANEL B - Timing difference
M.E. TSTAT
Parent characteristics
Member of 1 club in 1981 0.0342 (2.27)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1981 0.0759 (2.48)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1981 0.1945 (3.08)
LR chi squared (32) 233.92 p=[0.000]
Controls As in Panel A
PANEL C - Joint modelling, parent outcome 1991
M.E. TSTAT
Parent Characteristics
Member of 1 club in 1981 0.0674 (2.76)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1981 0.1402 (5.19)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1981 0.2609 (5.60)
LR chi squared (60) 1,366.58 p=[0.000]
ρ -0.5942 p=[0.000]
Controls As in Panel A
PANEL D - Timing difference and joint modelling, parent outcome 2000
M.E. TSTAT
Parent Characteristics
Member of 1 club in 1981 0.0450 (2.82)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1981 0.1109 (4.05)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1981 0.2145 (4.15)
OBSERVATIONS 1,943
Notes: (i) regional controls included; (ii) regional controls included;
(iii) panel C joint model corresponding parent outcome in 1991 is in Table 3 column 1;
(iv) panel D joint model corresponding parent outcome in 2000 is in Table 3 column 2.
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Table 4: Great Britain (BCS) - Probability Child is a Member of a Club in 2004 (Joint
Modelling)
CHILD OUTCOME 2004 -
probability of
ZERO CLUBS ≥THREE CLUBS
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.1135 (2.04) -0.1201 (2.04)
Age of child age squared -0.0046 (2.08) 0.0048 (2.08)
Male 0.0229 (1.73) -0.0242 (1.74)
Child in good health -0.0469 (2.08) 0.0420 (2.10)
Child has siblings 0.0031 (0.12) -0.0033 (0.12)
Number of schools child attended 0.0064 (0.91) -0.0068 (0.91)
Number of friends child has -0.0377 (4.89) 0.0399 (4.90)
Number of books owned by child -0.0116 (2.64) 0.0123 (2.64)
Child in single parent family 0.0277 (1.35) -0.0272 (1.45)
White 0.0754 (3.79) -0.1128 (2.70)
Parent characteristics
Male 0.0332 (1.59) -0.0322 (1.53)
O levels highest qualification -0.0774 (5.42) 0.0967 (4.66)
A levels highest qualification 0.0371 (0.93) -0.0340 (1.08)
Diploma highest qualification -0.1105 (8.21) 0.1952 (5.26)
Degree highest qualification 0.0049 (0.11) -0.0051 (0.11)
Log benefits 0.0006 (0.09) -0.0006 (0.09)
Log non labour income 0.0113 (0.75) -0.0120 (0.75)
Log labour income 0.0027 (1.18) -0.0029 (1.18)
Own house -0.0382 (2.29) 0.0394 (2.35)
Member of 1 club in 2000 -0.0310 (2.02) 0.0394 (1.97)
Member of 2 or more clubs in 2000 -0.0715 (3.14) 0.1076 (2.35)
LR chi squared (60) 743.91 p=[0.000]
ρ -0.8337 p=[0.000]
OBSERVATIONS 1,290
Notes: (i) regional controls included; (ii) parent outcome shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: Great Britain (BCS) - Probability Parent is a Member of a Club in 2004 (Joint
Modelling)
PARENT OUTCOME 2004 -
probability of
ZERO CLUBS ≥FOUR CLUBS
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Child characteristics
Member of 1 club in 2004 -0.1350 (3.45) 0.0956 (3.31)
Member of 2 clubs in 2004 -0.1340 (3.23) 0.0985 (2.99)
Member of 3 or more clubs in 2004 -0.1427 (3.22) 0.1089 (2.88)
Parent characteristics
Number of adults in household -0.0030 (0.10) 0.0020 (0.10)
Number of children in household -0.0418 (3.52) 0.0316 (3.50)
White -0.2811 (4.79) 0.1443 (6.44)
Married -0.1161 (3.80) 0.0778 (3.85)
Male -0.0231 (0.63) 0.0160 (0.62)
O levels highest qualification -0.0939 (3.07) 0.0673 (2.91)
A levels highest qualification -0.0718 (1.17) 0.0529 (1.08)
Diploma highest qualification -0.1416 (3.44) 0.1106 (3.01)
Degree highest qualification -0.2364 (3.92) 0.2135 (2.98)
Log benefits -0.0076 (0.68) 0.0052 (0.68)
Log non labour income -0.0550 (1.84) 0.0375 (1.84)
Log labour income -0.0128 (2.92) 0.0087 (2.91)
Own house -0.0768 (2.55) 0.0517 (2.57)
Attends religious service -0.2114 (6.34) 0.1733 (5.29)
Frequency family eats together -0.0844 (4.22) 0.0575 (4.34)
Frequency family see relatives 0.0211 (0.52) -0.0146 (0.51)
Parent works ≥ 45 hrs per week -0.0237 (0.29) 0.0166 (0.28)
LR chi squared (60) 743.91 p=[0.000]
ρ -0.8337 p=[0.000]
OBSERVATIONS 1,290
Notes: (i) regional controls included; (ii) child outcome shown in Table 4.
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Table 6: U.S. (PSID) - Probability Child is a Member of a Club in 2002
PANEL A - CHILD OUTCOME 2002 -
Number of clubs parent attends probability of
ZERO CLUBS ≥FOUR CLUBS
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Child characteristics
Age of child -0.1665 (4.19) 0.2085 (4.21)
Age of child age squared 0.0055 (3.70) -0.0069 (3.72)
Male 0.0438 (3.54) -0.0554 (3.52)
Child in good health -0.0460 (2.32) 0.0499 (2.67)
Child has siblings -0.0149 (0.84) 0.0178 (0.88)
Number of moves 0.0113 (0.89) -0.0142 (0.89)
Number of friends child has -0.0024 (0.78) 0.0030 (0.78)
Number of books owned by child -0.0142 (1.49) 0.0178 (1.49)
Child in single parent family 0.0053 (0.33) -0.0066 (0.31)
White 0.0033 (0.21) -0.0041 (0.21)
Parent characteristics
Male -0.0029 (0.15) 0.0037 (0.15)
Years of schooling -0.0026 (0.24) 0.0033 (0.24)
Log benefits 0.0020 (0.64) -0.0025 (0.64)
Log non labour income 0.0037 (0.95) -0.0046 (0.95)
Log labour income -0.0031 (1.95) 0.0039 (1.96)
Own house -0.0416 (2.42) 0.0482 (2.62)
Member of 1 club in 1997 0.0105 (0.66) -0.0128 (0.68)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 1997 -0.0275 (2.81) 0.0369 (2.68)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 1997 -0.0586 (3.16) 0.0971 (2.40)
LR chi squared (82) 609.86 p=[0.000]
ρ -0.2222 p=[0.149]
PANEL B - CHILD OUTCOME 2002 -
Number of hours parents spend in clubs probability of
ZERO CLUBS ≥FOUR CLUBS
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Parents characteristics
Number of hours parent spends in clubs in 1997 -0.0091 (2.67) 0.0114 (2.72)
LR chi squared (42) 174.24 p=[0.000]
Controls As in Panel A
OBSERVATIONS 1,375
Notes: (i) state controls included;
(ii) panel A joint model, corresponding parent outcome in 2004 in Table 7 panel A.
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Table 7: U.S. (PSID) - Parental Social Interaction in 2004
PANEL A - probability of volunteering NEVER DAILY
M.E. TSTAT M.E. TSTAT
Child characteristics
Member of 1 club in 2002 -0.0543 (1.15) 0.0204 (1.09)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 2002 -0.0978 (2.34) 0.0359 (2.25)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 2002 -0.1881 (3.85) 0.0805 (3.21)
Parent characteristics
Age -0.0168 (1.13) 0.0060 (1.13)
Age squared 0.0002 (1.46) -0.0001 (1.45)
Number of adults in household 0.0060 (0.32) -0.0021 (0.32)
Number of children in household -0.0108 (0.67) 0.0039 (0.67)
White -0.1004 (3.34) 0.0357 (3.28)
Married -0.0619 (1.09) 0.0217 (1.11)
Male -0.0741 (1.24) 0.0256 (1.28)
Years of schooling -0.0365 (6.53) 0.0131 (6.12)
Log benefits -0.0077 (1.12) 0.0028 (1.11)
Log non labour income -0.0126 (1.74) 0.0045 (1.63)
Log labour income -0.0034 (0.79) 0.0012 (2.79)
Own house -0.0512 (1.56) 0.0178 (1.60)
Attends religious service -0.1085 (0.96) 0.0356 (3.76)
Frequency family eats together -0.0205 (2.73) 0.0074 (2.7)
Frequency family see relatives -0.0482 (0.96) 0.0184 (0.91)
Parent works ≥ 45 hours per week -0.0700 (2.30) 0.0265 (2.17)
LR chi squared (82) 609.86 p=[0.000]
ρ -0.2222 p=[0.149]
PANEL B - Number of hours volunteered in 2004
Child characteristics COEF TSTAT
Member of 1 club in 2002 0.5253 (1.27)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 2002 0.6527 (2.03)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 2002 0.9307 (2.34)
LR chi squared (43) 116.32 p=[0.000]
Controls As in Panel A
PANEL C - Number of times volunteered in 2004
Child characteristics COEF TSTAT
Member of 1 club in 2002 0.7147 (2.95)
Member of 2-3 clubs in 2002 0.8817 (4.11)
Member of 4 or more clubs in 2002 1.1175 (4.51)
LR chi squared (43) 240.70 p=[0.000]
Controls As in Panel A
OBSERVATIONS 1,375
Notes: (i) state controls included.
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Table 8: U.S. (NLSY) - Probability Child is a Member of a Club in 2002
M.E. TSTAT
Child characteristics
Age of child 0.9223 (11.13)
Age of child age squared -0.0334 (11.38)
Male -0.0058 (0.42)
Child in good health -0.0004 (0.02)
Child has siblings -0.0165 (1.15)
Number of schools child attended -0.0073 (0.70)
Number of friends child has -0.0065 (0.93)
Number of books owned by child 0.0320 (3.91)
Child in single parent family -0.0409 (2.48)
White -0.0199 (1.24)
Parent characteristics
High school highest qualification 0.0185 (1.00)
College highest qualification -0.0107 (0.30)
Degree highest qualification -0.0151 (0.56)
Log net family income 0.0046 (2.37)
Own house 0.0061 (0.40)
Member of 1 club in high school 0.0111 (0.60)
Member of 2-3 clubs in high school 0.0322 (2.70)
Member of 4 or more clubs in high school 0.0647 (2.45)
LR chi squared (22) 498.07 p=[0.000]
OBSERVATIONS 1,070
Notes: (i) regional controls included.
Table 9: U.S. (NLSY) - Number of Weeks Parent Undertook Voluntary Work in 2005
COEF TSTAT
Child characteristics
Member of a club in 2002 0.5009 (3.09)
Parent characteristics
Age 8.4191 (3.32)
Age squared -0.1717 (3.38)
Number of adults in household -0.0542 (0.84)
Number of children in household -0.0659 (0.73)
White 0.3221 (1.50)
Married 1.4741 (6.35)
High school highest qualification 0.3945 (1.43)
College highest qualification 0.1430 (0.42)
Degree highest qualification 0.7232 (2.09)
Log net family income 0.0882 (4.00)
Own house 0.4184 (1.96)
Attends religious service 0.5827 (3.14)
Frequency family eats together 0.3853 (2.42)
Frequency family see relatives 0.3236 (3.46)
Parent works ≥ 45 hours per week -0.4173 (1.48)
LR chi squared (20) 277.77 p=[0.000]
OBSERVATIONS 1,070
Notes: (i) regional controls included.
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